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Local Connections: Electoral Institutions, Social Networks, and Local Politicians in a
Developing Democracy1
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University of Pittsburgh and Vanderbilt University
Presented at the 4th Annual Political Networks Conference, Ann Arbor, MI
18 June 2011

This paper explores the impacts of electoral institutions on citizens’ social networks and political
engagement, using the case of Brazil. Brazil’s combination of open-list proportional
representation and extreme multipartism leads to high numbers of connections between citizens
and local politicians and activists. Survey data from a 2008 city council race reveal that a very
high percentage of respondents know both politicians and activists. Such connections serve as
an important source of political socialization and mobilization. Using coarsened exact matching,
I show that these ties affect campaign learning, turnout, and clientelistic dispositions, and that
they often have a more powerful effect than do respondents’ closest discussants. This paper thus
illuminates a hitherto unrecognized consequence of Brazil’s much-studied and distinctive
institutional arrangements, while at the same time developing a new framework for theorizing
and measuring the ways in which citizens’ networks incorporate politicians.
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O que mais importa no Brasil é o QI: Quem indica.2 (Popular Brazilian saying)

How do the political institutions structuring elections affect citizens’ engagement with
the electoral process? In this paper I focus on the ways in which political knowledge and
behavior are shaped by the institutions of open list proportional representation and multipartism
at the local level, using the case of Brazil. This institutional arrangement allows citizens to vote
either for candidates (here, city council candidates) or party lists; votes serve simultaneously to
rank parties against each other, determining the numbers of seats each party wins, and to rank
candidates within parties, determining which candidates get the seats the party has won. The
question of electoral institutions’ impacts on engagement with the political system has aroused a
great deal of scholarly attention, but research yields conflicting expectations. Some scholars
argue that proportional electoral formulas – and by extension the multipartism typically
accompanying them – increase the proportion of citizens that perceive a real possibility of
winning or benefiting from the election, boost citizens’ senses that their preferences are reflected
in elite-level politics, and promote engagement with the political system (Anderson et al. 2005;
Anderson & Guillory 2003; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer Forthcoming). A very different body of
literature focused on Brazil, however, argues that the combination of proportional representation
and open list ballots leads to disengagement, and that having too many choices is confusing and
cognitively taxing, rather than empowering (Almeida 2006; Nicolau 2006; Rennó 2004, 2006).
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The first part of the sentence reads “What matters most in Brazil is….”; what follows is a play on words.

“QI” is a common abbreviation for “quociente de inteligência,” or IQ in English. However, here “QI” is instead
defined to stand for “quem indica,” meaning “who recommends you.” In other words, what matters is not
intelligence, but connections to the powerful.
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Both bodies of scholarship, however, have evidenced an important blind spot by focusing
on isolated citizens, each individually interacting with the political world. They thus ignore the
importance of social connections to the way citizens understand politics and engage their
political systems. A social network approach illuminates the links between electoral institutions
and party systems, on the one hand, and citizens’ engagement with democratic contests, on the
other. Institutions affect whom citizens know and from whom they receive political information;
such network influences, in turn, affect democratic engagement.
Due to the combination of extreme multipartism and open list proportional
representation, Brazilian federalism provides a high number of opportunities for office-holding at
the local level—and an exceptionally high level of competition for office. As a result, a
remarkably high percentage of citizens knows local politicians, leaders, and activists. I argue
that these contacts serve as a gateway into the political world, affecting three aspects of citizenlevel engagement: knowledge of the campaign, turnout, and clientelistic dispositions. First,
social ties to politicians provide the well-connected access to political expertise that increases
their own stores of knowledge. Second, political connections may have an even stronger impact
on political participation, as politicians and activists seek to mobilize the members of their own
personal networks first before moving on to the broader electorate. Third, however, this
influence may not be entirely benign. The same social ties that stimulate knowledge and
participation may also stimulate clientelistic trades of material resources for political support.
This paper thus not only illuminates the effects of electoral institutions, but it helps us
understand the patterns and effects of citizens’ social ties to politicians, at least within one
country. To the extent that scholars around the world have examined this issue, they have tended
to focus on instrumental interactions such as clientelism or “contacting,” rather than on the
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existence of social ties that may but do not necessarily have instrumental uses. And while
clientelism has long been viewed as an inherently interpersonal phenomenon, this study
innovates in viewing clientelism as a product, at least in part, of a combination of social
networks and institutional structures.
Though Brazil’s institutional arrangements are very far from direct democracy, they do
provide an unusual number of opportunities for citizen engagement in the electoral arena. As a
result, participation in local political contests may be concentrated in an elite group of citizens to
a somewhat lower degree than in other representative democracies. Advocates of direct
democracy have long held that democratic participation is self-perpetuating, that taking
leadership roles improves citizens’ democratic character and makes them more capable of future
participation (Mill 1991; Pateman 1970). Indeed, empirically oriented scholars have shown that
participation is self-reinforcing and can lead to future engagement (Finkel 1987; Finkel & Ernst
2005; Gastil et al. 2002; Gastil et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2003; Leighley 1991). While this paper
does not tackle the effects of campaigning or running for office on the activists and candidates
themselves, it does suggest that this kind of engagement has spillover effects on others within the
activists and candidates’ networks. In a sense, these activists and candidates can be seen as
“opinion leaders” within a classic two-step model of information transfer, though the analogy has
obvious limitations: their information tends to come not just from the media but also from
personal experience, and they have more at stake in the information transfer than the typical
“opinion leader” in Lazarsfeld and coauthors’ famous studies (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et
al. 1948; Luna & Altman 2011).
This paper also contributes to cross-national work on the conceptualization and
measurement of social networks. In much of the political behavior literature, social networks are
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conceived as small, close-knit groups comprised of a main respondent (also often called the ego)
and a group of at most three to five discussants. I term such groups “intimate egocentric
networks.” This research shows that more complete measurement of the broader egocentric
network needs to take into account other types of connections, ones that are usually unreported
within the intimate network but that have important ramifications for political behavior.
The case I examine is the municipal election campaign of 2008 in Juiz de Fora, Brazil.
Focusing on a single city has both strengths and limitations. On the one hand, it makes it
difficult to know the extent to which the findings here generalize to all of Brazil. Still, as will be
discussed in greater detail below, Juiz de Fora is typical of many other Brazilian cities in
theoretically important ways. On the other hand, the case study approach makes it possible to
cluster the study within neighborhoods, facilitating a deeper understanding of both neighborhood
political organization and the general neighborhood social environment.
The next section discusses the impacts of Brazil’s institutional structure on political
culture, and then shows how this structure leads to high rates of connections to politicians and
activists. It then argues that such links help citizens engage the political world. The third section
considers the measurement and conceptualization of networks, advocating the explicit
incorporation of social ties to political leaders and activists. After discussing the case under
consideration as well as measurement and analytical strategies, the remainder of the paper
presents results and discusses their implications.

Electoral Institutions, Social Networks, and Political Engagement
Observers of Brazilian politics argue that the country’s open-list proportional
representation system and consequent extreme multipartism contribute to elite-level political
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dysfunction as well as disengagement at the mass level (Almeida 2006; Ames 1995, 2001, 2002;
Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñan 1997; Nicolau 2006; Rennó 2006; Zucco 2009)
(but see Desposato 2006 for an important critique of this argument). A number of mechanisms
are thought to be in play. First, the open-list ballot increases candidates’ incentive to cultivate a
personal vote in order to improve their rank within their parties; competition among candidates
within parties in turn weakens those parties at both the elite and mass levels (Carey & Shugart
1995; Kinzo 2005; Samuels 2006). Second, high district magnitudes decrease politicians’
abilities to claim credit effectively for policy achievements, increasing incentives for clientelism
and under-the-table deals (Ames 1995, 2001; Bezerra 1999; Maldonado 2011; Samuels 2001,
2002). Third, the high number of candidates may be confusing and cognitively difficult for
citizens to process (Almeida 2006; Rennó 2004, 2006).
But while these institutional features might indeed weaken party identification and
facilitate clientelism at the mass level, this literature has overlooked other features of Brazilian
political culture, namely its high levels of turnout (even in comparison to other countries with
compulsory voting) and discussions of politics (Faughnan & Zechmeister 2011; Rennó et al.
Forthcoming). Social networks may be the missing link. A consequence of Brazil’s institutional
arrangements that has largely been ignored is the high number of politicians this system
produces, particularly at the local level. The burden of this paper is to show that these
politicians, as well as other local activists, provide the citizens in their social networks with
personal connections to the political world. Such connections may help citizens engage with and
understand their political system. At the same time, these connections may also contribute to
clientelism and personalism as well as the erosion of Brazilian parties, as citizens vote for friends
and family members rather than based on party allegiances or, even less, ideology.
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A large number of people campaign for public office in Brazil, particularly at the local
level. In the election campaign for city council in Juiz de Fora in 2008, 26 parties ran candidates
for public office.3 Under the open-list proportional representation system operating in elections
for city council, state legislatures, and the federal Chamber of Deputies, each party by law is
allowed to run as many candidates as there are open seats, plus a certain quota of suplentes, or
substitutes who will replace elected officials who stand down after their terms have begun.
While most of the 26 parties in Juiz de Fora’s 2008 election operated in coalition and thus were
not able to run the maximum number of candidates, two of them fielded 32 candidates each. In
total, 384 candidates received votes for 19 elected positions. With 257,380 valid votes and
313,366 total votes in the entire city, this means that there were 670 voters casting valid votes for
every candidate, or 810 total voters per candidate.4
Candidates were not randomly sampled from the population, of course: they tended to be
people with large social networks, leaders who were well-respected in their own communities.
They were neighborhood association presidents, pastors or lay church leaders, doctors, local
business owners, people in high profile unelected positions in public agencies, radio announcers,
and activists, in addition, of course, to those who were already holding or had previously held
elected public office. Especially in a gregarious, generally extroverted country such as Brazil, it
is easy to imagine that many candidates had personal ties to well over 800 voters. Thus, it is
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The data here are from election results published by the national electoral court, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,
http://www.tse.jus.br/internet/eleicoes/estatistica2008/est_result/resultadoEleicao.htm, and are based only on
candidates receiving votes. It is possible, though unlikely, that there were additional candidates not reflected in
these statistics who ran for office but received no votes. After all, each candidate should be guaranteed at least his
or her own vote.
4
Voting is mandatory for all literate citizens between the ages of 18 and 69, and optional for illiterates and for
citizens who are aged 16-17 or over 70. Turnout typically hovers between 80 and 85 percent of registered voters.
Thus, the number of voters is a rough approximation for the total number of adults of voting age in Brazil. Citizens
who choose to go to the polls to avoid penalties but support no candidate may cast an invalid vote.
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quite feasible that many or even most Juiz de Fora voters knew personally at least one candidate
who was running for public office.
Juiz de Fora is not unusual in the Brazilian political context. In Brazil as a whole in the
2008 local elections, there were about 110 million voters divided across a little over 330,000
candidates for 52,000 city council slots. Thus, there were 308 valid votes and 333 total voters
for each city council candidate in the country, and only 2,117 voters for each candidate elected.
The number of voters per candidate is strongly related to the size of the municipality; in smaller
cities, there are fewer voters per candidate. Nonetheless, in other cities similar to Juiz de Fora—
ones that are not state capitals (the largest municipalities in Brazil are all state capitals) and that
have over 200,000 voters—there were just 858 voters per candidate. And in state capitals, there
were 1,921 voters per candidate. Statistics for state capitals are skewed by the cities of São
Paulo, where there were 6,422 voters for every candidate, and Rio de Janeiro, where there were
3,048 voters for every candidate.5 Thus, apart from the largest municipalities, and especially in
smaller cities, one can suspect that most Brazilians personally knew city council candidates.6
Political connections do not stop at candidates themselves. Many Brazilians also know
cabos eleitorais, or grassroots campaigners. Sometimes volunteers, sometimes paid workers,
cabos eleitorais pledge themselves to drum up votes for particular candidates. In some cases,
they actually have quotas, self-imposed or imposed by the candidate, for obtaining a certain
number of verbal commitments to vote for their candidates. Cabos eleitorais are typically
chosen for their people skills and, even more importantly, for their connections. A good cabo
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São Paulo is the largest city in Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro the second largest.
Not only electoral math but also Brazilian political culture reinforces the expectation of high levels of
acquaintanceship with politicians. The Brazilian electorate is characterized by low rates of party identification and
of trust in parties, and by high rates of personalism (Almeida 2007; Carreirão 2007; Kinzo 2004, 2005). Voters
often report that they vote for “the person, not the party.” And historically Brazilian politics has been dominated by
personalistic relationships between politicians and citizens.
6
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eleitoral has a large social network and is well-respected in the community. Importantly, the
number of candidates should largely determine the number of cabos eleitorais, especially in
typically poorly funded local races.
In an influential essay, Carey and Shugart (1995) argue that institutions such as the openlist proportional representation system found in Brazil generate a high incentive to cultivate a
personal vote. Furthermore, they hold that this incentive should increase with rising district
magnitude, meaning the number of seats up for allocation in the district. In the Brazilian case,
however, it appears that personalism, at least as measured by the extent to which citizens know
politicians, may actually decrease as district magnitude rises, since as district magnitude rises,
the ratio of politicians to citizens falls in Brazil. The arguments developed here thus suggest a
reformulation of Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory. What matters may not be the absolute
number of seats up for grabs in the district, but rather the ratio of politicians to citizens.
Having established the first link in the chain – the way electoral institutions shape
networks – I move on to the second – the way these networks affect citizen engagement with the
political system. From the early days of research on social influence in the US, scholars have
identified the importance of connections to intermediaries or opinion leaders, who channel
information and mobilization (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). However, the effect
of personal acquaintanceship with political leaders on general democratic dispositions has not
previously been shown. At the most basic level, I surmise that citizens with such political
connections will know more about politics and will be more likely to participate. The reasons
should be fairly clear: politicians and activists are likely to seek votes from those in their

8

immediate social networks first. Such vote-seeking will typically involve information transfer,
and it should certainly result in electoral mobilization.7
Information and mobilization may not be the only democratic traits affected by local
political connections. The same social network relationships may also increase access to
clientelistic transfers of material resources, and make respondents more likely to accept
clientelism on a normative level. Such transfers encompass a great range of goods and services:
from donations of cestas básicas (charity food baskets), to invitations to churrascos (barbecues),
to direct monetary payments, to jobs, to a politician’s use of political muscle to get a client a bed
at a public hospital. A recent study found that eight in ten Brazilians believe city council people
should pay for hospital bills and funeral expenses of people in need, while six in ten agreed more
generally that politicians should provide money to people in need ("Voto, Eleições e Corrupção
Eleitoral" 2008). At the same time, 30 percent of people report that they are aware of cases of
vote buying. These statistics suggest both the great extent of material resource transfers between
local politicians and citizens; and that there may be many cases of material transfers that citizens
do not perceive as vote buying. Beyond politicians, cabos eleitorais should also engage in
material resource transfers with voters; in the more egregious and obvious cases of vote buying,
7

Does compulsory voting in Brazil affect the ability to use electoral participation as a dependent variable? While
compulsory voting almost certainly boosts turnout, it is far from completely effective. For comparative evidence on
compulsory voting and turnout, see Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), Franklin (2001), and Norris (2004). The
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance classifies Brazil’s level of enforcement as “weak”
and reports that turnout has hovered around 80 percent of eligible voters over the past twenty years (International
IDEA 2008). Studies show that abstention is related to factors similar to those affecting turnout in countries with
voluntary voting, factors such as political interest and education (Castro 2007; Katz 2008; Maldonado 2011; Power
2009). Thus, we can meaningfully examine the extent to which social influences pull people who otherwise might
not vote into electoral participation, or push them out of the process.
There is a second concern related to compulsory voting: not that it actually results in universal turnout, but
that it could trigger overreporting. Overreporting of voting is a concern in all countries (Belli et al. 1999; Clausen
1968; Traugott & Katosh 1981). It may be particularly a concern in a compulsory voting country such as Brazil,
since overreporting is higher when respondents feel greater pressure to vote, and in countries where turnout rates are
higher (Bernstein et al. 2001; Traugott & Katosh 1979). Unfortunately, there are no studies of vote overreporting in
Brazil, and it may be impossible to obtain data for verification purposes from the federal government.
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in fact, cabos eleitorais may be more likely to engage in clientelism, doing the dirty work in
order to keep their candidates’ hands clean.
An important literature on clientelism examines whose vote gets bought. At the country
level, vote buying is strongly associated with inequality as well as with other political historical
factors (Brusco et al. 2004; Vilaça & Albuquerque 2003). At the same time, though, literature
suggests that at the individual level citizens who are already mobilized in other ways are the
most likely to be the targets of clientelistic offers (Auyero 2000; Faughnan & Zechmeister 2011;
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2010; Stokes 2005). While most of this literature focuses on civil
society engagement, it seems highly likely that politically oriented social capital should also
foment clientelistic networks.
Until now, most research on the connections between citizens and politicians has viewed
such contacts through the lenses of “contacting” or of instrumentally motivated interactions such
as clientelism or the Chinese “guanxi.” But contacting a politician is not the same thing as
having social ties to one. One may contact a politician whom one does not know personally, and
one may know a politician whom one never chooses to “contact,” at least in the sense in which
political scientists tend to use this term. Similarly, knowing a politician personally does not
conduce automatically to clientelistic exchanges. While instrumental motivations may certainly
lead some citizens to seek social ties to politicians (and likewise, often motivate politicians to
seek social ties to citizens), such social ties may also be the product of other life activities:
membership in the same church, residence in the same neighborhood, or graduation from the
same high school. The Chinese notion of “guanxi” refers to useful and often hierarchical social
connections in which favors are granted in return for social recognition, and are facilitated by
relationships based on mutual trust and affection (Lin 2001). While guanxi comes close to this
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network perspective in emphasizing that the connections predate the instrumental contact, the
centrality of resource transfers to the relationship differs from my approach here. Instead, I
argue that the political mobilization that occurs in politician-citizen relationships in Brazil is for
the most part not triggered by citizens instrumentally contacting politicians, though it may come
from politicians instrumentally leveraging their pre-existing networks. From the citizen’s
perspective, flows of information, appeals for mobilization, and clientelistic offers occur in the
course of other, non-political life activities. This perspective then enables us to examine
empirically the relationship between networks and instrumental exchanges such as clientelism.

Reconsidering Social Networks
The literature on social networks at the citizen level has tended to conceptualize what are
known as “egocentric” (meaning main-respondent-centered) networks as small, close-knit
groups, typically comprised of a handful people with whom the individual has frequent contact.
These groups, which I will term “intimate” egocentric networks, are typically measured using
survey batteries that ask the respondent to report the three to five people with whom they most
frequently discuss either “important matters” or “politics” (Bailey & Marsden 1999; Huckfeldt
& Sprague 1995; Klofstad et al. 2009). Note, however, that there is nothing inherent in
egocentric networks that constrains them to be small, close-knit groups; an egocentric network
could theoretically consist of an ego and hundreds of alters.
There are two problems with limiting measurement of networks to the intimate egocentric
network. First, it dramatically truncates the number of social connections measured,
constraining respondents to know only the members of their own small networks and no one
else. In a typical urban environment, both in Brazil and elsewhere, many people have some

11

fleeting contact with literally hundreds of other people on a daily basis: in public transit, on the
street, at the supermarket, at school or work. While many of these contacts have little political
relevance, it is hard to believe that only the three to five people measured in the intimate
egocentric network have any political influence. Second, the approach ignores the broader social
and political structure in which networks are embedded. While some network members hold
little social or political capital, others contribute important political resources. The typical
intimate egocentric network measures, however, assume that each alter is associated with the ego
in a relatively horizontal and equal relationship.8
Neglect of the larger network is of particular concern in a country such as Brazil, where a
gregarious culture and a series of institutional factors already described in detail lead to a
situation in which many citizens personally know politicians and political activists. These
connections are unlikely to be mentioned in response to a name generator battery, precisely
because they represent “weak ties”: casual acquaintanceship with politicians, political activists,
and neighborhood leaders. Nonetheless, they constitute highly important network connections
that must be taken into account as part of a more broadly construed egocentric social network.
Moreover, the great disparities in social and political capital and status between the average
citizen and the politicians and activists to whom they are connected should also be taken into
account. That is, it is not enough simply to devise a way to count connections to politicians and
activists within the intimate egocentric network; they should be treated separately.

8

For an examination of the role of hierarchy in political discussion in the very different context of Japan,

see Richey (2009).
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Estimating the Consequences of Local Political Connections: Analytical Methods
I seek to understand the causal impact of the “treatment” variables—social network
connections to politicians and to cabos eleitorais—on three dependent variables—political
knowledge, turnout, and clientelistic orientations. The experimental ideal might involve
randomly assigning Brazilians to different conditions. Some would be assigned to the control
group in which they knew no one, a second group would be assigned to know politicians, and a
third group cabos eleitorais. Since the assignment to the treatments and control would be by
design orthogonal to the distribution of the outcome, I would be able simply to assess the
difference in means between the treatment and control groups on each of the dependent
variables.
In the real world, of course, local political connections are far from randomly distributed.
Appendix Table 1 shows that Brazilians who are more interested in politics, who are of higher
social status, who are more connected to civil society, and who live in lower status and more
clientelistic neighborhoods are more likely to know politicians and activists. This indicates that
it will be difficult to estimate the causal effect of social networks on political orientations, since
the distribution of the “treatment” (social networks) is associated with the distribution of other
variables known to affect political orientations. I employ coarsened exact matching in an
attempt to eliminate these threats to causal inference. This would not necessarily pose a problem
for causal inference, except that some of these factors should also determine the distribution of
the dependent variables. Thus, any association discovered between the treatment and outcome
might result not from the causal effect of the treatment, but from the impact of the other variables
associated with it.
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In order to deal with these threats to causal inference, I employ coarsened exact matching
(CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus et al. 2009, 2010). Matching techniques allow researchers
to develop treatment and control groups that are balanced, or similar in all relevant respects
except for their assignment to the treatment. More precisely, they seek to eliminate differences
between the treatment and control in the distributions on the other independent variables
affecting the treatment (Angrist & Pischke 2009; Gelman & Hill 2007). Once these pre-existing
differences are eliminated, researchers can be more confident that any remaining differences
between the treatment and control groups on the dependent variables are due to the treatment.
Thus, matching restricts the sample to the “region of common support,” or the observations
where the configurations of independent variables include members of both the treatment and
control. CEM is a monotonic imbalance bounding matching estimator that seeks exact matches
between treatment and control on each independent variable. The method is described in further
detail in the appendix.
In the primary models presented in this paper, I develop a single dichotomous treatment
variable measuring ties to either politicians or cabos. Subsequently, I check for the marginal
effects of each type of social tie, using matching to balance the groups with and without the ties
in question and at the same time controlling for the other type of tie. That is, matching estimates
of the effects of knowing politicians also control for knowing cabos; matching estimates of the
effects of knowing cabos also control for knowing politicians.
Caveats apply to this analysis. Different respondents are in the treatment group for each
of the two treatment variables, and these groups are imbalanced in somewhat different ways. As
a result, the region of common support is different for each treatment variable, and the matching
procedure produces different matched treatment and control groups for each. This means that
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the models are estimated on slightly different samples for each treatment variable. Inferences
can be drawn safely only within the region of common support—that is, at levels of each
independent variable for which there are cases in both the treatment and control groups. In
addition, the fact that the models of the effect of each type of tie control for the other type of tie
reduce the significance of estimated effects, especially because the effects of the alternative tie
are necessarily estimated without matching.
Another important caveat applies. Matching methods assume that all confounding factors
that threaten the ability to draw causal inferences are observed, and that once these factors have
been matched upon, the process of assignment to treatment is orthogonal to the distribution of
the outcome. If this assumption is violated, matching will not adequately deal with all barriers to
inference.

Estimating the Causes and Consequences of Local Political Connections: The Case and
Measures
In this paper I examine the case of the local elections of 2008 in Juiz de Fora, Brazil. A
city of about half a million residents in the state of Minas Gerais, about four hours inland from
Rio de Janeiro, Juiz de Fora is relatively prosperous by Brazilian standards but in important ways
typical of other Brazilian cities. First, as previously discussed, the city is typical in its ratio of
politicians to citizens. Second, both elite and mass political culture are typical of other Brazilian
municipalities. During the 2008 election campaign, the incumbent mayor, José Araújo, was a
stand-in for the previous mayor, Alberto Bejani, who had been unseated in a major corruption
scandal earlier that year. And parties remained weakly rooted at the mass level, with most
citizens rejecting any party identification. The data analyzed here are from a survey of 1,089
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Juiz de Fora residents conducted in November, 2008, just after the end of the second round
election. Surveys were clustered in twenty-two randomly selected neighborhoods, with
approximately fifty interviews per neighborhood.
The analysis assesses how social networks affect three citizen traits, measured with five
dependent variables. First, political knowledge is a count of correct answers to five factual
questions about the local election campaign, including the parties of the top two mayoral
candidates, the name of the current mayor, the name of the city council candidate who received
the highest number of votes in the first round election, and the number of seats on the city
council; plus an indicator for whether the respondent was able to name all six mayoral candidates
in the first-round election. Second, I examine two dimensions of political participation: electoral
and campaign participation. Turnout is an ordinal variable measuring whether the respondent
reports voting in the first and second round local elections. Campaign participation is also an
ordinal variable formed by summing indicators for whether the respondent worked on a
campaign, used campaign stickers, put up posters, attended a rally, or watched a televised debate
during the most recent election campaign. Third, clientelism is operationalized using two
variables: a measure of whether the respondent reports knowing “no one,” “one or two people,”
“three to five people,” or “more than five people” who sold their votes; and a question asking
whether the respondent believes it is “very good,” “good,” “bad,” or “very bad” to receive
presents from politicians. The first question measures insertion into clientelistic networks, while
the second measures normative acceptance of clientelism. Unfortunately, given the sensitivity
surrounding vote buying, it was infeasible to ask directly whether respondents had traded
something for their own votes.

16

Social networks and political discussion are measured using a number of variables. First
and most importantly, I use a dummy variable for whether the respondent reports knowing either
city council candidates or cabos eleitorais. Later I use separate dummy variables for whether the
respondent knows each one individually. Second, I use an ordinal variable measuring the size of
the reported intimate egocentric network, from 0 to 3. Third, I also control for the respondent’s
general level of political discussion using an index measuring the amount of political
conversation reported, on a four-point scale, with friends, family, in the neighborhood, at bars
and restaurants, and at work or school.
Is there any relationship between the size of the intimate egocentric network and local
political connections? I focus here on cabos eleitorais because they, more than other political
connections, are the kinds of “ordinary citizens” who would be most likely to be reported in
response to the intimate network battery. It is impossible to know whether any given intimate
egocentric network member is a cabo eleitoral. However, one way to get a handle on whether
respondents list connections with cabos eleitorais in response to the network battery is to assess
the percentage of respondents who provide the names of no network members, but who also say
they know cabos eleitorais or politicians. If many respondents who say that they have no
political discussants later report knowing cabos eleitorais, it will be clear that the standard
battery does not completely measure such connections.
It turns out that 49 percent of those reporting no political discussants in response to the
intimate egocentric network battery later say that they know someone who is a cabo eleitoral.
Among those reporting at least one network member, the percentage is only slightly higher, at 53
percent. But perhaps the omission of these kinds of weak ties does not matter very much. This
would be the case if network size as reported in response to the standard network battery

17

effectively proxied for unreported social contacts. Granted, most respondents do not report the
cabos eleitorais in their networks; but perhaps respondents who report the largest egocentric
networks are the same ones who have other unmeasured political contacts. I find low but
significant correlations between the size of the intimate egocentric network and acquaintanceship
with politicians (r = .08) and cabos eleitorais (r = .12), respectively. However, the correlation is
far from strong enough for the intimate network to serve as a proxy for other kinds of
connections.
Other independent variables were coded as follows. Interest in local politics is coded on
a four-point scale. Media attention is an index ranging from 0 to 1, based on the mean of the
number of days per week that the respondent reports accessing news on television, on the radio,
on the Internet, and in newspapers. Group memberships is an index formed by summing
indicators for whether the respondent reports belonging to a social club, a sports team, a union,
or another group. Education is coded on a 15-point scale ranging from no formal education to
graduate school completed. Neighborhood education is the mean of education for all
respondents in each of the 22 neighborhoods sampled. Education serves as the only measure of
social status in part because of nonresponse regarding household income. Age is coded in
number of years.

Results
I begin by considering the incidence of social connections to politicians and activists.
Three-quarters of the sample report knowing personally someone who is a candidate for city
council. Moreover, over half know a cabo eleitoral who is working for a candidate. Smaller
proportions of the population, though, report having talked with a politician or a cabo eleitoral
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about the election. In other words, for many respondents acquaintanceship with politicians and
activists is incidental to other life activities, and it does not necessarily always come bundled
with intense political discussion. Figures 1 through 3 demonstrate that these kinds of
connections are associated with political interest, group memberships, and education.
Nonetheless, what is perhaps surprising about these figures is the extent to which political
connections are common even in groups that one would expect to have few such connections.
Appendix Table 1 develops multivariate models examining how these and other variables affect
the rates of local political connections.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 here.
How do local political connections affect behavior? Preliminary analysis suggests that
these social ties affect political choices; 63% of those who reported voting in the first-round
election claimed to know personally the city council candidate they supported.9 I am primarily
concerned, however, with networks’ effects on democratic engagement, rather than on vote
choice. To assess social networks’ causal impacts, I match each “treatment group” member on
the significant predictors from the models estimated in Appendix Table 1. The CEM procedure
is discussed in further detail above and in the appendix.
Table 2 assesses the effects of social network connections to local political leaders on
knowledge of local politics, participation, and clientelism, using a dichotomous variable for
either type of connection. The fact that these models employ matching boosts confidence that
the findings are due to the impact of social networks themselves, rather than being the spurious
result of some associated variables. Exposure to local politicians and leaders affects three of the
five dependent variables. While Brazilians with political connections do not appear to know

9

79% of respondents who reported the name of the city council candidate whom they had supported said that they
knew the candidate personally.
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more about politics, they are much more likely both to vote and to get involved in campaigns in
other ways. In addition, local political connections are a strong predictor of the extent to which
respondents know others who have traded their votes. Finally, the treatment is unrelated to
attitudes towards receiving presents from politicians. In fact, the only robust effects from the
clientelistic attitudes models are for education and age. This suggest that responses to the
question about the desirability of trading one’s vote where strongly conditioned by social
desirability bias, and that those least sensitive to this bias have lower educational levels and are
younger.
Table 2 here.
This analysis has developed a single “treatment” variable for respondents who know
either city council candidates or cabos eleitorais. But which types of connections are more
important? Do results hold when each is assessed individually? In Figure 4 I present the
coefficients for the “treatment” variables from models in which matching is performed on each
of the key independent variables individually. Since the two key "treatment” variables are
moderately correlated at .31, and the number of observations in the matching model is reduced,
the inclusion of both treatment variables simultaneously may reduce the ability to find either
significant. Thus, I present results from two models for each treatment variable: one in which
the treatment variable in question is entered without its pair (for instance, “Knows Candidate” is
entered without controlling for “Knows Cabo”) and the other in which the pair is controlled (for
instance, “Knows Candidate” is entered while controlling for “Knows Cabo”).
Figure 4 here.
The most important difference from the results presented in Table 2 is that while the
combined treatment did not appear to have any effect on campaign-related knowledge,
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disaggregating the two we find that each has an independent, though not overwhelmingly large,
effect. These results hold in both the models controlling for both treatment variables and
introducing each variable separately. Apart from knowledge, we find that the impact of political
connections on turnout comes almost entirely from knowing candidates, not those who campaign
for them. However, cabos eleitorais may be slightly more successful in stimulating other forms
of campaign participation. Finally, both types of social ties insert respondents into vote trading
networks, but neither has any effect on clientelistic norms.

Discussion and Conclusion
These results provide strong evidence that social network connections to local politicians
and activists are quite prevalent in Brazil, and that they have a powerful impact on citizens’
democratic dispositions. A very high proportion of voters knows someone who is running for
city council, and many also know someone who is campaigning for a candidate. In fact, in this
survey 82 percent of respondents has at least one of the three kinds of network connections
measured here. And just as the rate of acquaintanceship with city council candidates is quite
high, the effects of such acquaintanceship on political behavior are quite pronounced. Brazilians
learn about politics from and are mobilized by the politicians in their social networks. Cabos
eleitorais, or grassroots campaigners, are also important agents of political socialization, though
both rates of acquaintanceship and impacts are not quite as high as for city council candidates.
In particular, cabos eleitorais seem surprisingly ineffective at stimulating turnout, though they do
effectively mobilize their network members into other forms of political participation.
Moreover, the results provide suggestive but not conclusive evidence that both city council
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candidates and cabos are likely to target the members of their own social networks for
clientelistic exchanges.
At the same time that network connections to politicians and activists are prevalent,
however, they are not particularly democratically distributed. As is the case with many other
political resources, those of higher status and who are more politically and civically engaged
have greater access to both city council candidates and cabos eleitorais. At the same time,
however, residents of lower status are also more likely to know both candidates and
campaigners. Not only do the uneven distributions of social network connections threaten our
ability to develop causal inferences, but they have a substantive implication. While politicians’
and activists’ social networks can serve as an important source of political socialization, their
influence is necessarily limited by the extent of their reach.
In the introduction I situated this study in the context of the literature on direct
democracy. What is happening in Brazil is far from direct democracy, with probably less than 1
percent of voters ever attempting public office. Nonetheless, at the local level the Brazilian
political system does get an unusually high percentage of citizens personally involved in the
dispute for elected office. Given the normative importance of theories of direct democracy and
the generally recognized impossibility of implementation of such a system in large contemporary
democracies, the Brazilian system’s impacts on citizens and politicians should be investigated.
What are the effects and normative implications of Brazil’s unique institutional structure
at the local level? On the one hand, it certainly stimulates citizen engagement. In the 2008 local
election campaigns, most Brazilians knew personally someone who was running for office:
perhaps a cousin, a friend, a neighbor, a doctor, or a pastor. For those who had a social network
member involved in the campaign, these personal connections provided a gateway to the political
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world. On the other hand, these results provide suggestive evidence that citizens who knew
politicians and activists were more likely to be offered something—perhaps a job, a hospital bed,
money, or food—in exchange for their votes. This makes sense and coincides with qualitative
evidence from field interviews. Clientelistic exchanges are most likely between politicians and
casual acquaintances.
Moreover, even though personal connections to politicians and grassroots campaigners
certainly provided opportunity for political conversation and mobilization, these conversations
likely were far from the ones envisioned by advocates of direct and deliberative democracy. For
the most part, political candidates and cabos eleitorais did not discuss ideological or policy
issues with the members of their social networks. Brazil is a soccer country, and from the
average citizen’s perspective the campaign process looks something like a soccer tournament at
best: the most interesting part involves teams’ and players’ strategies and prospects for winning
and losing, not their political platforms.10 Social ties to politicians may provide some citizens
with a team (or at least a player) to root for, but do not necessarily educate them on the substance
of political decision making.
The arguments laid out here also have implications for the debate over the effects of
Brazil’s combination of open-list proportional representation and extreme multipartism,
providing grounds for a somewhat less negative evaluation of the effects of this unique
institutional structure. At the local level, it turns out, Brazil’s electoral and party systems
provide opportunities for quite high levels of citizen engagement with the political system. Until
now, this effect has gone largely unrecognized in the debate over the system’s impact.

10

This soccer analogy is a Brazilianized version of the “horserace” analogy often used in the study of American
politics.

23

This research also uncovered two measurement issues that should be pursued further.
First, it showed that the standard measures of social networks in the political behavior literature,
ones concentrating on the three to five people with whom the respondent talks most frequently,
are incomplete measures of a respondent’s politically relevant social network. The factors
affecting the reporting of the intimate egocentric network as well as the extent to which it is an
effective proxy for other social network features, should be investigated further. Second, these
results hint at the difficulty of measuring clientelism in the survey context, and at the importance
of developing better, more sensitive but nonintrusive measurements.
This paper leaves open a few questions about Brazilians’ political networks that should
be pursued further. First, to what extent do these results generalize to the entire country? Up to
what size of municipality is it common for Brazilians to know political candidates? It is fairly
clear that these results probably do not apply to the megacities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo,
both among the largest cities in the world. But do they apply in cities with populations of a few
million residents, for instance Salvador or Belo Horizonte? A nationally representative, stratified
survey could answer this question. And even more importantly, this paper leaves unanswered
questions about how politicians and cabos eleitorais use their networks. While some of the
mobilizing potential of networks may be due simply to casual socialization in the course of daily
life, we may assume that politicians and campaigners intentionally seek out and mobilize the
members of their own social networks. How they do so, though, remains for future exploration.
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Figure 4. The Marginal Effects of Political Ties, by Type, Multivariate Analysis Using
Matching
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Tables
Table 1: Contact with Politicians and Cabos Eleitorais
Knows someone who is a candidate for city council
Knows someone who is a cabo eleitoral
Talked with a politician who asked for vote
1-2 politicians
3-4 politicians
5 or more politicians

Percentage
75.6
55.5
41.4
16.5
11.3
13.7

Talked with a cabo eleitoral who asked for vote
39.3
1-2 cabos
15.1
3-4 cabos
9.0
5 or more cabos
15.2
Note: Percentages are weighted by neighborhood population, sex, and age.
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Table 2. The Effect of Political Connections on Electoral Engagement (Using CEM)
Campaign
Knowledge
Political Connections
Intimate Egocentric Network Size
General Political Discussion
Education
Age
Interest
Media attention
Cutpoint 1
Cutpoint 2
Cutpoint 3
Cutpoint 4
Cutpoint 5
Cutpoint 6
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared

Turnout Both Campaign Vote Trading
Rounds
Participation
Network

Presents are
Bad

0.252
(0.254)
0.152
(0.098)
0.456**
(0.147)
0.157***
(0.034)
0.01
(0.007)
0.157^
(0.085)
0.35
(0.561)
1.767*
(0.760)
2.889***
(0.796)
3.619***
(0.793)
4.409***
(0.775)
5.200***
(0.786)
6.501***
(0.888)
503

1.216***
(0.236)
-0.023
(0.169)
0.339
(0.228)
-0.005
(0.039)
-0.030*
(0.012)
0.153
(0.156)
-0.745
(0.880)
-2.048*
(1.004)
-1.375
(0.992)

0.508*
(0.210)
0.287**
(0.107)
0.596***
(0.165)
-0.043
(0.033)
-0.007
(0.006)
0.276*
(0.125)
0.656
(0.737)
0.288
(0.663)
2.401***
(0.676)
3.661***
(0.762)
4.840***
(0.785)
5.564***
(0.839)

1.455**
(0.465)
-0.147
(0.184)
0.297
(0.200)
-0.013
(0.057)
-0.032**
(0.010)
-0.055
(0.118)
0.389
(1.014)
2.342*
(1.101)
2.721*
(1.126)
3.131**
(1.153)
3.673**
(1.142)

-0.114
(0.286)
0.073
(0.140)
0.167
(0.183)
0.111***
(0.031)
0.017**
(0.005)
0.09
(0.092)
0.391
(0.575)
-0.79
(0.745)
0.802
(0.684)
2.576***
(0.704)

503

503

503

479

0.046

0.09

0.052

0.058

0.023

Notes: Models are weighted by neighborhood population, sex, and age. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered by neighborhood. Coefficients are significant at: ^ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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Appendix. Coarsened Exact Matching

The analysis uses coarsened exact matching in an attempt to mitigate concerns about
selection into the two “treatments,” social ties to city council candidates and to cabos eleitorais.
Appendix Table 1 presents hierarchical models of the factors affecting both types of connections.
We see that political interest, education, group memberships, and general political conversation
all promote network connections, while residents of higher status neighborhoods tend to have
fewer connections to politicians. Given the fact that respondents very obviously self-select into
political networks, matching will be important.

Appendix Table 1. Hierarchical logit models: Predictors of Social Network Connections
Knows a City Council
Candidate

Knows a Cabo
Eleitoral

Political interest

0.254**
0.199**
(0.076)
(0.067)
Education
0.040^
0.050*
(0.023)
(0.021)
Group memberships
0.489**
0.393**
(0.156)
(0.118)
0.057
0.042
Proportion of family and friends from
neighborhood
(0.093)
(0.085)
Intimate egocentric network size
0.114
0.118
(0.083)
(0.074)
General political conversation
0.340**
0.505**
(0.105)
(0.099)
Neighborhood education
-0.144*
-0.12
(0.061)
(0.077)
Constant
0.390
-1.396*
(0.588)
(0.710)
Number of observations
1056
1056
Rho (proportion of variance due to u)
0.02
0.07
Log pseudo-likelihood
-538.28
-656.61
Notes: Models include a neighborhood-level random effect. Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients are significant at: ^ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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The analysis uses coarsened exact matching (hereafter CEM) in an attempt to eliminate
threats to causal inference that may derive from observed covariates X that affect both the
outcome Y and assignment to a dichotomous treatment T  {Tc, Tt}, where Tc and Tt refer to
the value of the treatment in conditions that we will call the treatment and the control (Iacus et al.
2009, 2010). CEM is a simple but powerful method of matching that assigns each observation to
a point in k-dimensional space, where each axis in this space maps a covariate Xi, i 1,…,k.
Exact matching algorithms retain only those observations located at points occupied by at least
one observation for which T = Tc and at least one observation for which T = Tt. In other words,
all observations in either the treatment or control that do not have an exact match on all values of
the covariates are discarded. Traditional exact matching algorithms may lead to loss of the great
majority of the data, especially when X includes continuous variables for which it may be nearly
impossible to find observations with exact matches. CEM’s innovation is to “coarsen” the Xi,
grouping similar values on each variable together in theoretically and empirically meaningful
ways. A variable for income, for instance, might be recoded into quintiles of the income
distribution or, in the Brazilian case, numbers of minimum wages received per month. A
variable for educational attainment by year completed might be recoded into school levels (i.e.,
elementary school, middle school, high school, university). Each “coarsened” variable thus has
fewer values, increasing the probability that matches can be found in both the treatment and
control without loss of theoretically relevant precision. Each k-dimensional point in the new,
coarsened space is called a stratum or, using the language of histograms, a bin.
Beyond its intuitive simplicity, CEM has a number of advantages as a method of
matching. It is a member of the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB) family of matching
algorithms, meaning that the analyst defines the maximum amount of imbalance through the
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matching design, rather than discovering the degree of imbalance only after performing the
matching algorithm. Second, it meets the congruence principle, meaning that the matching
algorithm retains the dimensionality of the data, rather than reducing the matching criterion to a
unidimensional score such as occurs in propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching.
This avoids the possibility of two very different configurations of the data being mapped onto the
same point on a unidemsional scale. Third, it is approximately invariant to measurement error
and bounds estimation error in the ultimate causal quantity of interest.
In this paper, I developed a matched sample for each of the three treatment variables
separately. I chose to do so rather than to treat them as ordinal components of a single latent
variable. These social network features are each theoretically distinct, and an ordinal measure
summing the incidences of all three would fail to differentiate among the very different kinds of
connections being measured. From a statistical perspective, moreover, combining the three
network variables into a single measure for the purpose of matching would result in an overnarrowing of the data set, since the covariates affecting treatment vary from one treatment to
another.
Appendix Table 1 describes the features of the matching solution for each of the three
treatment variables. The L1 statistic is a measure of the difference in the proportion of the
sample in each stratum and runs from 0 to 1, where 1 represents complete imbalance (i.e., no
overlapping strata) and 0 represents complete balance. We can see that each matching solution
yielded complete balance on the independent variables included in the model, but that each also
resulted in a pruning of the number of observations in both the treatment and control groups.
This pruning naturally restricts the conclusions we can draw to the region of common support.
Appendix Table 2. Results from Coarsened Exact Matching on Three Treatment Variables
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Knows
Knows a City
Knows a Cabo
Either
Council Candidate
Eleitoral
L1 (Imbalance) pre-matching
0.637
0.591
0.543
L1 (Imbalance) post-matching
0.000
0.223
0.272
Number of strata
463
463
463
Number of strata matched
91
101
140
Number of treatment observations
879
820
545
Number of treatment observations matched
355
352
313
Number of control observations
199
258
533
Number of control observations matched
153
190
348
Note: Matching performed using cem routine for Stata, developed by Blackwell et al. (2009).
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